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This paper examines the role of credit providers in the EMU and assesses the 
effects of credit spreads and credit quantities on economic activity. Movements in 
credit spreads are far more successful than movements in the external finance mix 
in predicting near-term changes in real economic activity in ten EMU countries. 
However, the forecasting performance of the three credit spreads evaluated in this 
paper is uneven. A risk premium extracted from individual corporate bond yields 
predicts three measures of economic activity fairly well in Germany and Southern 
Europe. Two other credit spreads, the ‘spread’ and the ‘ECB-spread’, have pre-
dictive power for some measures of economic activity but they fail to predict 
consistently across either a range of economic indicators or countries. 
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Non-technical summary  
 
This paper assesses aggregate credit conditions and their potential ramifications for aggregate 
economic activity in ten member countries of the euro area over the period 2003–2016. The 
countries included in the study are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The sample period begins a few years after the 
formation of the EMU, covers the Global Financial Crisis and the European Debt Crisis, and 
ends at a time when relative stability returns to financial markets.  
At the heart of the paper lies a simple question: do movements in the prices of credit 
provide more information about future economic activity than changes in the quantity of 
credit outstanding do? To answer this question, the price and sources of credit must first be 
defined in the context of a simple theoretical model that follows Adrian, Colla and Shin 
(2013). 
There are two sources of credit for a typical firm as a borrower. The first source of credit is 
a risk-neutral, perfectly competitive bank that pools the savings of households in the form of 
demand deposits. Along with the bank’s equity base these demand deposits fund the loan 
portfolio. The bank charges the going lending rate on loans and pays the riskless rate on 
deposits. Loans are not guaranteed to be paid back. There is an element of risk in that the firm 
borrowing funds may invest in projects that fail. To compensate for this risk, the bank charges 
a risk premium. The second source of credit is direct borrowing by firms from risk-averse 
households. To access this source of credit, firms issue bonds at the going rate. The differ-
ences in the attitudes to risk of banks and households matter. If there is a very low probability 
of a project defaulting, the sole criterion that matters in a bank’s decision of whether to offer 
credit of a certain size is the probability of default; this is not so for households who operate 
in a risk-return trade-off environment and are willing to accept greater volatility of returns in 
exchange for higher expected returns. 
Starting from a low probability of the project defaulting, suppose this probability increases 
somewhat. Banks react by cutting their loan portfolio, thus forcing up the lending rate. This 
increase in the interest rate charged on borrowed funds induces households to provide more 
credit to firms despite the higher risk. There is thus a substitution of bond finance for bank-
financed credit against the backdrop of a rising risk premium. All told, there are offsetting 
movements in the quantity of the two sources of credit, but there is an unambiguous increase 
in the risk premium and hence in the cost of obtaining credit.   
The predictions of the model for movements in the price and the quantity of aggregate 
credit are verified empirically. The price of credit is defined in relative terms as the spread 
between the cost of borrowing for non-financial corporations from Monetary Financial 
Institutions less a low risk money market rate (Spread) or the ECB-Spread, which is the 
difference between the cost of taking out new loans and the swap rate. Towards the end of the 
paper we also introduce a measure of a bond yield spread that captures the risk premium in 
the bond market (GZ-Spread). The aggregate quantity of credit outstanding is measured as the 
sum of bank loans issued by MFIs and the volume of securities (bonds) issued by non-
financial corporations. To capture the changing composition of total credit outstanding, we 
calculate the ratio of bank loans to total credit and call it the ‘Finance Mix’. 
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The variables that are thought to provide information about changes in aggregate credit 
conditions through movements in relative price (Spread, ECB-Spread, and GZ-Spread) or 
changes in the composition of credit quantities outstanding (Finance Mix) appear in a simple 
forecasting equation. An aggregate economic indicator (Industrial Production, the Rate of 
Unemployment, Retail Sales, and Turnover of Capital Goods) is regressed on its own lags, 
lags of one of the spreads, and lags of the finance mix variable to gauge the relative predictive 
ability of the price-based and quantity-based financial information variables. Two tests with 
different sign restrictions are employed to measure predictive ability. The first test is a 
standard F-test that measures the exclusion restriction that all lags of the financial information 
variable can be omitted from the estimated specification, meaning that the financial variable 
has no predictive content for aggregate activity. The second test uses a t-test to check whether 
the sum of the estimated coefficients on the lags of the financial information variable accords 
with the predictions of the underlying model (sign test).  
The empirical results show that credit spreads provide a more reliable signal about near-
term economic activity than the composition of external finance does. A presumed link be-
tween changes in the composition of external finance and changes in real economic activity 
appears not to exist. These findings tend to support Adrian, Colla and Shin’s basic contention 
that movements in risk premiums rather than contraction in the total quantity of credit lie 
behind changes in economic activity.  
Overall the findings suggest, however, that the forecasting performance of credit spreads 
over a short horizon in the ten EMU member states is rather spotty. This assessment is based 
on the uneven performance of the credit spreads. The Spread is arguably a better predictor of 
real economic activity than the ECB-Spread. Even so, the Spread fails to predict consistently 
either across a range of monthly economic indicators or across countries. The strongest 
evidence in favour of the predictive ability of credit spreads comes from the corporate bond 
market. The GZ-Spread, a risk premium extracted from corporate bond yields, predicts 
Industrial Production, Retail Sales, and Turnover of Capital Goods fairly well in Southern 
Europe and Germany. 
Examining developments in credit markets in the euro area over the past 15 years leads to 
the conclusion that these markets have evolved unevenly. In the Netherlands, and particularly 
in Finland and France, the bond market was an important secondary source of credit long 
before the Global Financial Crisis. By contrast, in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and 
Portugal, the bond market’s relative share of the credit market gradually increased over the 
sample period, while it remained very small in Greece and Spain. The empirical study finds 
mixed evidence for the substitution hypothesis of bond finance for bank credit during 
recessions in the euro area. While there is no evidence at all for it during the first recession, 
there is selective evidence that bond issuance expanded and bank loans contracted during the 
second recession particularly in France and Italy and to a lesser extent in Greece and Spain. 
On balance, the size of the financial sector is not tied to the near-term forecasting perfor-
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Continental Europe is still battling the adverse consequences of the Global Financial Crisis 
and the ensuing Sovereign Debt Crisis. More than three years after the end of the last euro 
area-wide recession, quite a few member countries of the EMU had still not achieved pre-
crisis levels of output and were struggling to reflate their economies.1 The lasting impact of 
both crises and the slow recovery from them have led many commentators to believe that the 
root cause of the economic downturns in 2008 and 2011 is different from those that triggered 
recessions in the 1970s, 1980s or 1990s.2 Earlier recessions were caused by supply shocks and 
the resulting monetary policy decisions or outright monetary policy shocks. The catalysts 
responsible for the two most recent recessions were, however, financial in nature and 
intrinsically linked to fragile asset markets, excessive leverage by financial institutions and 
households, and unsustainable fiscal policies.3  
The recent upheavals in financial markets again turn the spotlight on the crucial role of 
credit for real economic activity. Two issues loom large in analysing the behaviour of credit 
markets as financial or economic conditions change, and these are the identification of shifts 
in credit outstanding and the causes underlying changes in the composition of credit. When 
credit shrinks in a financial crisis, the production of goods and services follows suit.4 While 
this process is well understood, there remains the important question of whether the decrease 
in aggregate credit is due to a reduction of the supply of credit, a fall in the demand for credit, 
or a combination of both. The other issue pertains to the behaviour of credit providers as the 
economic outlook changes. In a recent paper Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2013) (ACS) examine 
                                                 
1 Excluding countries that joined the currency union recently, nominal GDP was lower in Finland, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain in 2015 than in 2007. 
2 Much ink has been spilled elaborating on the causes of recessions. Taking a long-term perspective, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) aver that recessions triggered by financial crises tend to be severe and long-lasting. Claessens, 
Kose, and Terrones (2009) observe that recessions accompanied by credit crunches in OECD countries are 
longer-lasting and deeper than conventional recessions. Cecchetti et al. (2009) examine the length, depth, and 
output loss of contractions in the aftermath of banking crises in 35 advanced and developing countries over the 
1980–2007 period. They argue that banking crises are inherently diverse and their flow-on effects are instru-
mental in determining output loss. For instance, a banking crisis giving rise to a currency crisis results in higher 
output loss than a banking crisis leading to sovereign debt default. The view that financial crises are long-lasting 
and lead to large output losses is challenged by Romer and Romer (2015). Their narrative approach, based on a 
single contemporaneous information source, produces a measure of financial distress that ranges from a mere 
credit disruption to an extreme crisis. Examining the impact of financial distress on economic activity in OECD 
countries over a 40-year period before the Global Financial Crisis, Romer and Romer find it to be rather weak 
and transitory. Schularick and Taylor (2012) investigate the dynamics of money, credit, and the macroeconomy 
from 1870 to 2008 in 14 advanced countries. They conclude that monitoring the behaviour of credit aggregates is 
helpful in assessing the likelihood of future financial crises.  
3 Focusing on the changing characteristics of the financial sector and their consequences for the transmission 
process of monetary policy, Borio and Zhu (2012) emphasize that a low interest rate environment promotes 
greater risk taking by banks. In the face of financing and liquidity constraints, a potent risk-taking channel of 
monetary policy may destabilize the financial sector and ultimately cause substantial loss of output and 
employment. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) provide an analytical exposition of monitoring and risk taking by banks. 
The effects of changes in capital regulation on bank behaviour are described in VanHoose (2007). 
4 Schularick and Taylor (2012) find that the cumulative losses of real output and investment (relative to 
trend) following financial crises in the post-WW2 period (1948–2008) amounted to 7.9 and 25.7 per cent, re-
spectively. The losses are measured over a five-year period. Both bank assets and bank loans decreased 
considerably as well, assets by 14.4 per cent and loans by 25.8 per cent, while narrow money remained static and 
broad money decreased slightly.  
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the behaviour of credit providers – banks and the bond market – against the backdrop of 
worsening economic conditions. In their model bank loans or bonds are the two sources of 
credit that finance spending by firms. Importantly, direct credit is a substitute for inter-
mediated credit in much the same way as in Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993). Expecting the 
economic outlook to worsen in the near term, profit-maximizing risk-neutral banks cut their 
loan portfolio, thereby forcing companies to turn to the bond market to finance their expendi-
ture. This is not a seamless or costless process. To induce risk-averse households to absorb 
the newly issued bonds, the bond-issuing firms have to offer a higher risk premium. The rise 
in the risk premium raises the cost of borrowing, resulting in a partial reduction in the demand 
for funding. Their model-based analysis leads ACS to put forth the following propositions. 
First, there is an unambiguous widening of the gap between the cost of borrowing and the 
riskless interest rate as the economic outlook deteriorates. Second, as this unfavourable 
scenario unfolds there is a partial substitution of direct credit for intermediated credit: the 
supply of bank credit contracts while the volume of bonds outstanding expands, though not 
fully making up for the loss of bank credit because borrowing costs are higher. The model 
thus provides a convincing explanation in times of rising uncertainty or outright economic 
stress for the behaviour of the price of credit, measured in terms of a credit spread, and of 
credit quantities, measured in terms of the finance mix, which is the ratio of bank loans to the 
sum total of bank loans and the volume of bonds.5  
The principal question this paper addresses is whether the signalling properties of credit 
spreads and finance mixes are useful for predicting future economic activity. If financial 
frictions are an important conduit through which shocks are transmitted from the financial 
sector to the real sector of the economy, then movements in credit spreads and finance mixes 
should contain useful and relevant information about the real economy in the near-term 
future. A natural question to ask is which of the two financial indicators – the price-based 
indicator or the quantity-based one – has better predictive ability? We answer this question by 
evaluating the predictive power of credit spreads and the finance mix variable for a number of 
economic indicators in ten member states of the euro area over the sample period 2003–2016 
(March).  
Three observations motivate this comparative study. First, over the past 20 years the 
financial landscape of Europe has changed markedly. Although banks remain the dominant 
source of credit for non-financial corporations in the euro area, their role as the almost 
exclusive provider of funding has been circumscribed. The bond or securities market has 
emerged as an attractive, viable credit alternative to bank loans, particularly since the start of 
the Global Financial Crisis. In 2008 bonds accounted for approximately 7 per cent of total 
non-financial corporation debt outstanding. By 2015 this share had increased to about 11 per 
cent.6 The growing importance of the bond market is reflected in both the growing number of 
bond issuers and the larger number of bond issues.7  
                                                 
5 With the ACS model, the vexing identification problem does not arise as movements in the finance mix 
signal the transition of credit-constrained firms from the loan market to the bond market. As will be shown in the 
theoretical section, the catalyst for a reduction of bank lending is the perception of higher default risk on projects 
undertaken by firms but financed by banks. 
6 Banco de España (2015).  
7 Kaya and Meyer (2014) report that between 2008 and 2012 the number of bond issuers in the euro area 
more than doubled. More German firms relied on bond financing in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers; in France, Italy, Spain, a similar phenomenon was observed later in the wake of the Sovereign Debt 
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Despite the gradual trend observed towards greater reliance on bond financing in the euro 
area, the financial sectors of the individual countries are still fairly heterogeneous. Table 1, 
compiled from the ECB’s 2015 Report on Financial Structure, underscores that they vary 
considerably in both size and structure. Consider the rightmost columns. Measured as the 
ratio of assets held by the financial sector to GDP, in 2014 the Netherlands had the largest 
financial sector with a ratio of 13.2 and Greece had the smallest at 2.2. Germany’s financial 
sector was about four times the size of GDP in 2014. In addition, there is considerable 
variation in the way the financial sector has evolved in each country since the crisis period 
began in 2008.  For instance, between 2008 and 2014 there was a marked downward trend in 
the relative size of the financial sector in Austria, Germany and to a lesser extent Belgium, 
whereas the relative size of the financial sector trended upward in France and grew larger in 
Finland. Spain and Portugal saw the relative size of their financial sectors first increase and 
then decrease. Banks as monetary financial institutions account for at least 50 per cent of the 
overall size of the domestic financial sector in every country with the exception of the 
Netherlands. Across countries the share of bank assets has ranged between two and four times 
the level of GDP and has mirrored developments in the relative size of the domestic financial 
sector.8 In light of such considerable variation in the significance and evolution of the 
financial sectors in the euro area, the purpose of the empirical investigation is in part to 
establish whether the structure and depth of financial sectors matter for the ability of financial 
indicator variables to predict economic activity.  
Finally, previous studies such as Ng and Wright (2013) argue that the forecasting perfor-
mance of financial indicators is both time-dependent and intimately linked to the root cause of 
economic downturns. Analysing US data, they find that the predictive ability of the credit 
spread improves markedly while that of the term spread disappears altogether in the latter part 
of the sample period 1985-2012. They conjecture that the improved forecasting performance 
of the credit spread may result from the substantial growth of the financial sector relative to 
the other sectors of the US economy during the 1990s up to the early 2000s.9 Reflecting 
further on why credit spreads have become better information variables, they state: “[But] our 
results are consistent with the idea that business cycle fluctuations have different origins. The 
recessions of the early 1980s were caused by the Fed tightening monetary policy so as to 
lower inflation, with the effect of both an inverted yield curve and two recessions. The origins 
of the Great Recession were instead excess leverage and a housing/credit bubble” (p. 1140). 
Thus structural imbalances within the financial sector of the economy may affect the 
information content of financial indicator variables. To what extent financial imbalances in 
Europe, which ultimately triggered shock waves first in financial markets and then in the real 
sectors of the European economy, had led to perceptible changes in country-specific credit 
spreads and finance mixes before and during the ruptures is another focal point of this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Crisis. Adrian and Shin (2009) provide a glimpse of the growing importance of capital markets in the United 
States and the severe contraction of market-based credit during the Global Financial Crisis. 
8 There are stark differences between the EMU countries in the importance of the shadow banking sector 
(OFI). The shadow banking sector in the Netherlands is massive, equating to seven times the level of goods and 
services produced in 2012. It is twice as large as the traditional banking sector and expanding more rapidly. 
Belgium and Portugal, too, have sizeable shadow banking sectors whose size relative to GDP has however 
remained fairly constant since 2008. By comparison, the shadow banking sectors in Finland and Greece are very 
small. Pension funds account for a significant share of the financial sector only in the Netherlands. The insurance 
sector is most important in France, where its size equals approximately the level of nominal GDP. 
9 According to Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013), the share of the financial sector in total US GDP peaked 
at 8.3 per cent in 2006. This compares with 4.9 per cent in 1980. 
 
Table 1: Size and Structure of the Financial Sector in EMU Countries 
 
 Ratio of assets of MFI  
to GDP 
Ratio of OFI to GDP Ratio of PF to GDP Ratio of IC to GDP Ratio of FS to GDP 
Country 2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014 
Belgium 3.6 2.8 2.7 1.8 2 1.8 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.6 0.7 0.8 6.0 5.6 5.3 
Germany 3.9 3.1 2.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.5 0.6 0.6 4.9 4.2 3.9 
Greece na 2.1 2 na 0.1 0.1 na 0.002 0.002 na 0.1 0.1 na 2.3 2.2 
Spain 2.9 3.2 2.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.2 0.2 0.3 4.0 4.3 3.7 
France 3.7 3.8 3.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0 0 0 0.8 1 1.1 4.9 5.2 5.3 
Italy na 2.4 2.3 na 0.6 0.6 na 0.02 0.03 na 0.3 0.4 na 3.4 3.4 
Netherlands na 3.4 3.3 na 7 7.3 na 1.5 1.8 na 0.7 0.7 na 12.6 13.2 
Austria 3.6 3 2.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.3 0.4 0.4 4.7 4.1 3.7 
Portugal 2.6 3.2 2.6 1.2 1.1 1 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.3 0.4 0.4 4.2 4.7 4.1 
Finland 2.1 3 2.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.2 0.3 0.3 2.4 3.4 3.3 
Note: Abbreviations: MFI = Monetary Financial Institutions, OFI = Other Financial Intermediary, PF = Pension Funds, IC = Insurance Company, FS = Financial 
Sector, GDP = Gross Domestic Product, na = not available.   
The ratio of the size of the financial sector to GDP for a given year appears in the rightmost three columns and is calculated as the horizontal sum of the ratios of the 
four sub-sectors relative to GDP. 
Slight discrepancies are due to rounding errors. 
Source: Report on Financial Structure, ECB, October 2015 and author’s own calculations.  
This study of aggregate credit conditions in ten EMU countries finds that movements in 
credit spreads are far more successful than movements in the external finance mix in pre-
dicting subsequent changes in real economic activity. This tends to support the theory-based 
contention by ACS (2013) that increasing risk premiums capture tightening credit market 
conditions better than a contraction of credit. However, the forecasting performance of the 
three credit spreads evaluated in this paper is uneven. The strongest evidence in favour of the 
predictive ability of credit spreads comes from the corporate bond market. A risk premium 
extracted from individual corporate bond yields predicts three measures of economic activity 
fairly well in Germany and Southern Europe. Two other credit spreads based on the cost of 
borrowing from banks, the ‘spread’ and the ‘ECB-spread’, have predictive power for some 
measures of economic activity but they fail to predict consistently across a range of either 
economic indicators or countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a highly selective 
review of the pertinent literature and explains the rationale behind using credit quantities and 
credit spreads as indicator variables. Section 3 discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the 
model of ACS (2013). The empirical findings are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Credit quantities vs. credit prices 
 
Credit spreads and finance mix variables as indicators of conditions in financial markets have 
their origin in the literature on the credit channel of monetary policy in the 1980s and early 
1990s. 
A quantity-based finance mix figures prominently in Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) 
(KSW) who embed an expanded financial sector in a simple Keynesian model of aggregate 
demand to verify the existence of a bank lending channel in the transmission process of mon-
etary policy. Larger firms can choose between bank loans and commercial paper to finance 
their investment spending. Bank loans are special, however, to a firm as bank credit signals 
the firm’s creditworthiness to the wider public. In KSW’s analysis financial markets function 
properly and there is only one genuine financial friction.10 Small bank-dependent firms cannot 
access the commercial paper market if the supply of bank loans contracts due to a tightening 
of monetary policy. The finance mix variable, defined as the ratio of bank loans to the sum of 
bank loans and commercial paper, has a straightforward signalling property. A decrease in the 
finance mix variable reflects more stringent financial conditions and should lead in due course 
to a reduction in aggregate demand. The empirical results reported in their paper support the 
view that changes in the finance mix had substantial predictive power for various measures of 
economic activity in the United States during the post-WW II period. KSW interpret these 
findings, which are based on highly aggregated data, as direct evidence for a bank lending 
channel in the US monetary transmission mechanism.  
                                                 
10 DeFiore and Uhlig (2011, 2014) approach the issue of bank versus securities finance within a DSGE model 
characterized by agency cost. They argue that a switch from bank to bond finance occurs if the cost of acquiring 
information about projects rises suddenly for banks. To generate the change in the debt mix and sizeable 
increases in credit spreads simultaneously, two additional shocks, one affecting firms’ uncertainty about their 
productivity, and the other affecting their probability of default are needed.  
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Critical of this interpretation of the aggregate evidence, Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) point 
out that movements in the KSW finance mix variable may be due to compositional and 
behavioural changes on the part of firms rather than the existence of a bank lending channel. 
Subsequent empirical studies of the bank lending channel have therefore drawn on balance 
sheet data from individual banks to isolate shifts in banks’ lending behaviour. Kashyap and 
Stein (2000) study the behaviour of all US commercial banks over 1976–1993 and find that 
small, less liquid banks cut their loan portfolios after monetary policy tightening. They view 
this finding as strong support for the existence of a bank lending channel but are coy about its 
quantitative importance. Using a unique data set of more than 2 million loan applications 
lodged in Spain over the period 2002–2008, Jimenez et al (2012) find considerable quantita-
tive evidence in favour of a broad bank lending channel. Against a backdrop of tighter mone-
tary or economic conditions, low capitalized and less liquid banks tended to cut their lending 
substantially. After identifying shifts in the supply of bank credit in micro-level data, Bassett 
et al. (2014) construct an aggregate credit supply indicator and estimate that shocks to the 
aggregate credit supply cause real output to decrease by 0.75 per cent after two years.  
In a recent paper, Becker and Ivashina (2014) tackle the problem of identifying shifts in 
loan supply from the viewpoint of US non-financial corporations with access to both bank 
credit and the bond market. They observe a connection in micro-level data between changes 
in bank behaviour, seen as imposing tighter lending standards, suffering a greater share of 
non-performing loans, setting aside higher loan provisions, or the perceived performance of 
banks in their share price, and firms switching from bank debt to open-market debt. Realizing 
that small firms cannot issue bonds, Becker and Ivashina explore the ramifications of the 
behaviour of the larger, rated bond-issuing firms for smaller firms. They show that the ratio of 
bank loans to total external credit, computed for firms with access to both sources of credit, 
has predictive power for the likelihood of a small unrated firm getting a bank loan.  
ACS (2013) examine both aggregate and firm-level data in an attempt to identify shifts in 
loan supply. They argue that the micro-economic evidence points overwhelmingly to shocks 
to credit supply by banks and other financial intermediaries as the key driver of changes in 
total aggregate credit outstanding. They further document a shift from bank debt to open 
market credit during the Great Recession. Analysing funding decisions reported by firms 
during the economic downturn of 2007–2009 in the US, they find a 75 per cent decrease in 
new bank loans while the volume of new bonds issued nearly doubled. In addition, they report 
a widening of credit spreads for both loans and bonds in micro-level data. 
Credit spreads provide a timely signal of stress in financial markets. There are many fac-
tors that cause the difference to increase between, typically, a risky interest rate and a riskless 
(or less risky) interest rate: lenders sensing a higher probability of default by borrowers, a 
perception that the risk-bearing capacity of financial institutions and markets has decreased, 
assets becoming more illiquid as a result of turmoil in financial markets, a higher probability 
of a credit crunch, and others.11 By contrast, a substantial narrowing of a credit spread can 
                                                 
11 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) is one of the early theoretical contributions that stresses the importance of 
financial factors such as a firm’s cash flow in influencing the cost of external relative to internal finance. 
Borrowers’ characteristics determine this interest spread which is central to the balance sheet view of the credit 
channel of the monetary transmission mechanism. In their set-up (or in later papers such as Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1995)) there is only one homogenous financial sector that does not distinguish between banks and 
the bond market. 
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indicate excessive risk-taking by financial market participants and reflect increasing vulner-
ability in the financial sector. Stein (2014) argues that watching credit spreads is essential for 
making good decisions on monetary policy. Curdia and Woodford (2011) provide theoretical 
support for this claim. In a sluggish economy a central bank can improve welfare by easing 
monetary policy to counter a rising credit spread. 
Stock and Watson (1989), Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Gertler and Lown (1999) are 
early attempts to measure the forecasting power of credit spreads for economic activity. More 
recent examples are Philippon (2009) who shows that a variant of Tobin’s q, which varies 
proportionately with a credit spread based on US corporate and government bond yields, 
predicts capital investment much better than the standard Tobin’s q based on equity prices. 
The excess bond premium extracted from the difference between yields on corporate and 
synthetic bonds is a powerful predictor of US economic activity according to Gilchrist and 
Zakrajšek (2012). Ng and Wright (2013) find that the increase in the forecasting power of the 
credit spread computed by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek for the US is due to higher leverage and 
the rising importance of financial factors in shaping the US business cycle. Krishnamurthy 
and Muir (2015) find that credit spreads combined with information about pre-crisis credit 
growth predict the severity of financial crises.  
 
3. A theoretical foundation 
 
The theoretical framework underlying our empirical analysis follows ACS (2013). They 
investigate the effect of changes in default risk on the credit market in both absolute and 
relative size. The credit market is fed on the supply side by two sources. Banks supply inter-
mediated credit while households offer direct credit through the purchase of bonds from 
companies. The two suppliers of credit have different attitudes towards risk. While banks are 
risk-neutral, households are risk-averse. The recipients of bank credit and open-market credit 
invest the funds in projects that have a low probability of default and whose payoffs are 
determined by both aggregate and idiosyncratic factors. Changes in market perceptions set a 
chain of events in motion. They are mirrored in a change of the probability of default, which 
in turn affects the risk premium and hence borrowing rates. Changes in the risk premium also 
change the composition of credit supply through opposite shifts in bank credit and household 
credit with only a secondary effect on credit demand. 
We next sketch out the essential elements of the model. 
 
Banks  
Banks accept deposits (liabilities) and make loans (assets). The ratio of notional liabilities 




1 + 	 = , , 					 
(0)
where  r = lending rate 
  f = interest rate on deposits (riskless rate)  
  L = liabilities  
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  	= bank credit (loans) 
   = project risk (probability that a project will fail ⟶ default) 
   = value at risk (probability that the bank will fail) 
   = weight on the aggregate factor in determining the project’s pay-off. 
For a successful bank the value of its notional assets exceeds the value of its notional 
liabilities. Hence , ,  < 1. 





1 − 1 + 1 +  
											 (0)
From now on assume that the risk-free rate on deposits equals zero:  = 0. 
 
Households 
Households have mean-variance preferences. They solve the standard optimization prob-
lem that yields the optimal weight on the risky asset, which is bonds. The total supply of 
household credit (demand for bonds) is given by 
 
  =
1 − 1 +  − 1
1 +  							 
(0)
where   T = a measure of risk tolerance 
  = variance	of	the	realized	value	of	bonds,	which depends on  and . 
The risk premium is the expected return on the risky asset minus the return on the riskless 
asset: 
 
  , = 1 − 1 +  − 1				              (0) 
Equation (3) has a simple interpretation: the supply of household credit varies propor-
tionately with the risk premium on bonds adjusted for risk.12  
 
Market Clearing Condition  
Combining equations (2) and (3) yields the total supply of credit. The demand for credit 
-depends inversely on the risk premium. 
 
     - = .,        with ./, < 0         (0) 
 
Setting credit supply equal to credit demand yields 
 
   	 +  = ., or                        (0) 
                                                 
12 ACS define  as the variance of one unit of notional assets so that 1 +  = 01 2345 6.   
34
5 	is the 




1 − 1 + ,1 − 7 
+ 1 − 7
,
1 + , = .,								 (0)
where the definition of the risk premium (equation (4)) has been used to substitute for the 
interest rate.   
 
Tracing the Effects of a Change in Market Sentiment on Credit Conditions  
Using this highly stylized model, ACS then turn their attention to determining the effect of 
worsening economic conditions on the market price of risk and the willingness of banks and 
households to offer credit. They ask two specific questions: 
Q1: How does the risk premium ,	react to increases in the probability of project default 
(worsening economic fundamentals) ?  
Q2: What are the implications of worsening economic fundamentals for the size of the 
banking sector and the bond market?  
To answer the first question, ACS define excess demand as  
 
   8,,  = 		 +  − .,.     (0) 
 






9= = 0.         (0) 
 
Solving equation (9) for 
<;
<= , they obtain: 
 







													       (0) 
or 













> 0.							   (0) 
The derivative in expression (11) is strictly positive as the partial derivatives in the 
numerator are negative but positive in the denominator.13 
Supplying an answer to the first question is thus straightforward: the risk premium 
increases as project risk increases. The ‘required’ return rises relative to the riskless rate and 
credit becomes more expensive.  
To provide an answer to the second question, ACS construct iso-lending curves for banks 
and bond investors.14 The iso-lending curve is steeper for banks than for bond investors 
                                                 
13 For this result to hold unambiguously  must be small and , < 1,	 meaning the risk premium is small. 
14 An iso-lending curve shows the relationship between I and π for a fixed amount of credit provided by a 
credit supplier 
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because banks are risk-neutral while households are risk-averse. Suppose initially banks and 
bond investors supply the same amount of credit and the credit market is in equilibrium. Then 
market fundamentals deteriorate, driving up . The sequence of events unfolding is captured 
in Figure 1. The increase in	 causes bank lending to contract, leading to a rightward shift of 
the iso-lending curve of the banking sector. The risk premium π rises. For the credit market to 
clear, the bond market must make up the shortfall of credit supply relative to demand, which 
shrinks as π rises. The rise in π induces households to close the existing gap between demand 
and supply by providing more bond financing, resulting in an upward shift of the iso-lending 





























                  CB = Iso-lending curve for banks     CH = Iso-lending curve for households 
 
Figure 1: The change in the relative size of the banking sector and the securities market 
 
The model thus provides a ready answer to the second question. In the wake of an increase 
in default risk, the absolute size of the banking sector shrinks while the bond market expands. 





















The model just described gives rise to two clear-cut predictions about the behaviour of 
credit quantities and credit prices as the state of the economy – proxied by default risk – dete-
riorates. First, there are opposite movements in the components of credit: the volume of bank 
loans decreases while the volume of bonds increases. Second, the increase in the risk premi-
um raises borrowing costs as the spread between the cost of borrowing and the riskless 
interest rate increases. 
The predicted behaviour of credit quantities and prices in a changing economic environ-
ment is verified empirically in the next section. The intent is to establish whether movements 
in the quantity or prices of credit are better at predicting future economic activity in EMU 
countries. 
 
4. The empirical analysis  
 
In this section we examine developments in credit and output/labour markets in ten member 
countries of the euro area over the period 2003–2016 (March) from an empirical perspective. 
The countries included in the study are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.15 The data frequency is monthly observations of 
credit quantities, credit prices, and economic activity. Table 2 gives an overview of the scope 
of the empirical analysis and the data used in it.   
Our assessment of conditions in credit markets begins with an in-depth analysis of the 
quantity of credit outstanding – bank loans to non-financial corporations and securities issued 
by them – in the EMU countries before, during, and after the onset of financial crises.16 This 
is followed by an examination of borrowing costs and interest rate spreads that captures the 
sentiment towards risk in credit markets during periods of turbulence and relative calm. 
 
  
                                                 
15 Other EMU countries could not be considered because of a lack of data. 
16 Other components such as loans from insurance companies or trade credit are excluded. 
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Table 2: Scope of the Study and Data Employed in the Empirical Analysis 
 
Scope 10 member countries of the euro area (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) 
Sample period 2003-2016 (March) 
Data frequency Monthly 
Measures of credit NFC=Total Bank Loans to Euro-Area Non-Financial Corporations reported by MFI 
Institutions Excluding the ESCB17; All Currencies Combined.  
NFCSEC=Volume of Securities Issued by Non-Financial Corporations (Securities 
Other Than Shares; All Currencies Combined).         
Credit spreads  
 
Spread = Cost of Borrowing for Non-Financial Corporations – 3 mo Money Market 
Rate (calculated by the author). 
ECB-Spread = CoBNFC (across maturity spectrum) – Swap Rate (calculated and 
published by the ECB).18 
Official Definition of the ECB-Spread: Lending spread; weighted spread between the 
(MIR) rate for NEW NFC loans and the swap rate with maturity corresponding to the 
loan category initial period of rate fixation.  
GZ-Spread = Yield on Corporate Bonds – Yield on Synthetic (risk-free) Bonds 
averaged over all corporate bonds. 
Measures of 
economic activity 
Industrial Production, Unemployment Rate, Retail Sales (Index of Deflated Turnover), 
Turnover of Capital Goods 
Data sources Statistical Warehouse of ECB, EUROSTAT, DATASTREAM 
 
 
4.1. Credit quantities 
 
Figure 2 conveys the relative importance for non-financial corporations on the European 
continent of the two separate sources of credit, bank loans and corporate securities.19,20 It is 
readily apparent that no single uniform finance pattern applies to the ten EMU countries. 
Instead, the countries fall into three broad categories characterized by the share of securities 
relative to total credit outstanding. The first category comprises countries where bank loans 
are by far the most important source of credit, where securities account for less than 15 per 
cent of the sum total of bank loans and securities.21 The countries that fall into this category 
are Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain. The second category consists of Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, countries where securities represent between 15 and 30 per cent of 
the sum total of credit outstanding. In the two remaining countries – Finland and France – 
firm-issued securities are a significant alternative source of credit, accounting for at least 30 
per cent of credit.  
 
 
                                                 
17 ESCB = European System of Central Banks 
18 CoBNFC = Cost of Borrowing for Non-Financial Corporations; MIR = Monetary and Financial Institution 
(MFI) Interest Rate 
19 Following Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2013), we do not consider a third important source of finance, the issu-
ance of additional stock by companies.  
20 The two shaded areas represent European-wide recessions as determined by the Euro Area Business Cycle 
Committee of CEPR. The first recession started in the second quarter of 2008 and lasted until the end of the 
second quarter of 2009. The second recession lasted from the fourth quarter of 2011 until the first quarter of 
2013. 
21 This assessment is based on the average of the ratio of securities to the sum of securities and bank loans 
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Figure 2: The relative importance of bank loans and securities (million euros) 
Note: NFC = Bank Loans to Non-Financial Corporations NFCSEC = Securities Issued by Non-Financial 
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Figure 2: The Relative Importance of Bank Loans and Securities (million euros)(cont.) 
Note: NFC = Bank Loans to Non-Financial Corporations; NFCSEC = Securities Issued by Non-Financial 
Corporations. Shaded areas are recessions in Europe as determined by CEPR. 
 
Studying the graphs reveals further that in Belgium, France, and Portugal, the relative 
stature of the securities market has grown over time. In these countries the securities market 
has gained a larger share of the credit market at the expense of banking sector. In Austria, Fi-
land, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, the relative share of securities issued has remained 
relatively constant while in Greece an expanding securities market provided temporary relief 
from cutbacks in bank loan supply before shutting down during the European Debt Crisis. 
The Greek securities market has only recently sprung back to life.  
The next set of figures and the accompanying tables direct attention to the volume of real 
credit outstanding in each country, or the sum total of bank loans and securities deflated by 
the CPI. For each country we track the level of real credit (Figure 3A) and the changes in its 
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Figure 3A: Real credit volume (million euros) 
Note: Real credit is defined as 
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Figure 3B: Changes in loans and securities (million euros) 
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Figure 3B: Changes in loans and securities (million euros)(cont.) 
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Figure 3B: Changes in loans and securities (million euros)(cont.) 
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Figure 3B: Changes in loans and securities (million euros)(cont.) 
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Figure 3B: Changes in loans and securities (million euros)(cont.) 
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Figure 3A shows that the behaviour of real credit also defies a common pattern at the 
country level over time. In Finland and France real credit surged with minor exceptions 
throughout the sample period while other countries experienced more of a see-saw pattern. 
There are pronounced differences in the peaks but not in the troughs of real credit outstanding 
in the individual countries. In Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, real credit attained its 
maximum either during or on the heels of the recession triggered by the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2009. In Austria and Italy, the maximum occurred during or right before the onset of 
the second recession in 2011/12.22,23 Three countries – Belgium, Finland, and France – saw 
real credit peak in 2016.24 Table 3 provides summary information about the volume, growth 
rate and volatility of real credit. The level of real credit increased over the sample period in 
every country except Germany and Portugal. Finland recorded the highest average growth rate 
of real credit at 4.21 per cent and Germany the lowest at −0.28 per cent. By any measure, the 
volatility of the growth rate of real credit was severe. Only two countries – France and 
Germany – remained under the 10 per cent mark. Belgium at 23.68 per cent and Greece at 
21.86 per cent recorded the highest standard deviation of the growth rate of real credit.  
Inspection of Figure 3A yields a further noteworthy observation concerning the volume of 
real credit outstanding during recessions. It rose during the first recession in all countries but 
fell markedly during the second recession in all the countries on the southern flank and 
Austria, decreased moderately in Belgium and the Netherlands and remained virtually the 
same in Germany.25 Real credit continued to increase in Finland and France during the second 
recession.   
Figure 3B shows the changes in the components of real credit outstanding over the sample 
period. This figure accentuates the shrinking of the volume of price-adjusted bank loans 
during the latter half of the sample period in the countries on the southern flank of the EMU, 
notably Portugal, Spain and to a lesser extent Greece and Italy. Table 4 provides further 
details about changes in the components of real credit during the two recessions of the sample 
period. Examining the cumulative change in the volume of real loans and securities out-
standing during recessions should be helpful in assessing whether quantitative developments 
in credit markets support the bank lending view (ACS (2013), KSW (1993)), in which bank 
loans and securities are substitute sources of credit. 
                                                 
22 The sudden drop in real loans outstanding in Austria in June 2004 is due to a break in the time series data 
caused by a decision to reclassify borrowers. For instance, loans taken out by freelance professionals and self-
employed people were shifted from ‘loans to non-financial corporations’ to ‘loans to households’. The same 
applied for non-profit organizations. The negative spike in December 2012 is due to the redemption of securities 
which were not replaced with new issues due to low corporate investment activity at the time, as reported in the 
Financial Stability Report no 26, 2013 by the Austrian National Bank. 
23 In the Netherlands, real credit came close to peaking during the second recession in August 2012. At  
€ 497539 million it came close to the maximum of € 504493 million recorded in February of 2015. 
24 It may seem surprising that real credit outstanding in France is higher than that in Germany. French firms 
rely on external sources of credit far more than their German counterparts, which draw more heavily on internal 
funds. For more information on this, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2014). 
25 Essentially this observation rests on comparing ∆ST5UDST5VW5X ) at the beginning and end of the recessions 
whereas the changes in Table 4 are based on the change in loans (securities) deflated by the CPI in each period 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Credit Quantities over the Sample Period 2003m1–2016m3
  
Note: 1 Average of first or last four observations of sample period. 2 Sample period ends in 2016m02. 
3Annualized. 
Real credit is defined as 
ST5DST5VW5
5X^ ∗ 100 where CPI = 100 in 2015. 
 
 
Table 4: Cumulative Change in Real Loans and Real Securities during Recessions 
 
Country                  First Recession  
                 2008:4–2009:6  
               Second Recession 
                 2011:10–2013:3 
Change in Real 
Loans 
Change in Real         
Securities 
Change in Real 
Loans 
Change in Real   
Securities 
Austria 14875.6 5735.9 1922.2 −15299.0 
Belgium 12079.7 4758.2 56.7 −1194.5 
Finland 5421.9 2379.0 4660.1 8053.2 
France 47745.4 65186.6 −5036.1 71443.8 
Germany 49288.3 −11337.1 7144.9 22733.8 
Greece 3393.2 4407.8 −12508.9 1703.4 
Italy 36911.0 8450.7 −45893.0 20015.8 
Netherlands 26441.7 15020.6 17531.8 −6998.3 
Portugal 13562.6 8732.8 −13534.4 −4897.1 
Spain 32939.0 −991.9 −182496.0 2772.1 
  
Note: The change in real loans is defined as 
∆ST5
X  , the change in real securities is defined as 
∆ST5VW5
X , ∆_` = 
change in loans to non-financial corporations outstanding, ∆_`a = change in volume of securities (issued 












































































In the first recession from 2008:4 to 2009:6, the cumulative change in real bank loans 
outstanding was positive for all countries.26 For real securities the cumulative change was 
positive too in all countries but Germany and Spain. It is further the case that in France and 
Greece the cumulative change in real securities outstanding exceeded the cumulative change 
in real loans over the period 2008:4–2009:6. Thus during the first recession, companies in 
both countries turned increasingly towards the open market to raise credit, possibly as a result 
of tighter lending standards imposed by banks. It is clear from these observations on changes 
in bank loans during the first recession, a period of heightened probability of default, that the 
shrinkage of the lending portfolio of banks did not occur as implied by the ACS model. The 
model’s prediction is more on the mark with respect to securities. In all but two countries the 
volume of real securities outstanding expanded during the first recession.  
In the second recession, the cumulative change in real bank loans outstanding was negative 
in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The volume of price-adjusted loans decreased 
every month in Spain while in Greece and Portugal it did so in all but one month. The 
deleveraging of bank loans was particularly acute in Spain where real bank loans had de-
creased by €182496.0 million by the end of the second recession.27 In France, Greece, Italy, 
and Spain the cumulative decrease in real bank loans outstanding was accompanied by a 
cumulative increase in real securities outstanding.  The cumulative increase in real securities 
in France and Italy was substantial; indeed in France the accumulation of real securities 
exceeded the decumulation of real loans by a factor of 14! In Italy dwindling bank loans were 
only partially compensated for, to the tune of about 45 per cent, by rising balances of real 
securities. In Greece and Spain, the increase in real securities outstanding pales in comparison 
to the decrease in real loans outstanding. In Finland and Germany bank loans did not decrease 
but there appeared to be a switch away from bank loans towards securities during the second 
recession. In Germany the cumulative change in real securities outstanding was three times 
the cumulative change in real bank loans outstanding. In Finland the ratio of cumulative 
changes in real securities to changes in real bank loans came to 1.73. In Austria, Belgium, and 
the Netherlands, bank loans did not decrease during the second recession while securities did. 
Are these observations consistent with the ACS view of the way credit markets operate as 
marked fundamentals deteriorate? On balance, the data paint a mixed picture in the EMU 
countries. In a few countries credit aggregates did move in line with the prediction of the ACS 
model during the second recession. The data suggest that the substitution of one source of 
credit for another worked reasonably well in France and Italy as companies managed to raise 
credit in the bond market in the face of possibly decreasing bank support. While the volume 
of real loans outstanding did not decrease in Finland and Germany during the second 
recession, indications are that the securities market became a vital alternative source of credit 
in the wake of the Sovereign Debt Crisis. In contrast, it is difficult to say anything definitive 
                                                 
26 Lending may rise during a recession because of loan commitments that require banks to provide extra 
funding in case a company encounters cash flow problems. Bank loan commitments were most likely less 
common during the second recession because of the imposition of tighter lending standards by banks after the 
first recession. Changes in the volume of bank loans outstanding support this view. Comparing the first column 
with the third column of Table 4 reveals that cumulative changes in real loans outstanding were much smaller, if 
positive, or were actually negative during the second recession. However, these developments are also consistent 
with a reduction in loan demand that may have set in because of a weakening economic outlook. 
27 The steep decline in real loans outstanding at the end of 2012 in Spain is due to the transfer of non-
performing loans from the domestic banking sector to SAREB, Spain’s state-owned resolution agency (Banco de 
España (2013), Deutsche Bundesbank (2014)). 
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about credit market developments in Spain and Greece. In Greece the securities market did 
not trade in eleven months of the recession; in Spain, the securities market remained too small 
to be a viable alternative source of credit. In Portugal both the securities and loan markets 
shrank in real terms, pointing to the co-existence of an all-out credit crunch and an implosion 
of loan demand. A similar experience befell Austria and Belgium where the cumulative 
change in the volume of real securities outstanding was negative but changes in real loans 
were positive but small. 
An important result of our examination of the quantity of credit in the EMU countries is 
that the two components of credit, bank loans and securities, have evolved in different ways 
across time and countries. The absence of a common pattern over the whole sample period is 
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The array of graphs shows variations in the finance mix over time in each country. This 
finance mix is defined as the ratio of bank loans outstanding to the sum total of bank loans 
and securities outstanding.28 This ratio has two natural advantages. Not only does it reflect the 
importance of bank loans relative to securities as a source of finance but it also helps identify 
the existence of an aggregate ‘bank lending’ channel that is activated by a change in monetary 
policy or general financial conditions. If banks reduce their lending and firms are cut off from 
their traditional source of credit, firms seek to tap into the bond market to secure funding. If 
this scenario proves correct, then the finance mix should decrease in size.  
The finance mix depicted in Figure 4 encapsulates the relative importance of bank loans 
and bonds as sources of external finance. Note that during the second recession the finance 
mix decreased to varying degrees in a number of countries, notably Finland, France, Germa-
ny, Italy, and Spain, which is possibly an indication of the shrinking relative size of the 
banking sector during the crisis period. Due to its potential as an informative signal about 
changing financial market conditions, the finance mix variable features prominently as the 
‘quantity-based’ information variable in the forecasting equations.  
  
4.2. Credit prices 
 
A variety of factors account for the common use of price measures of credit in empirical 
analyses of credit markets. Market interest rates are published at high frequency intervals and 
are thus readily available; they are measured with great precision, react instantaneously to 
news, and, importantly, can easily be applied in cross-country comparisons;29 they are inextri-
cably linked to asset prices which are inherently forward-looking and flexible. This last prop-
erty means that movements in and between market interest rates are apt to provide useful 
information about future real economic activity rather than merely reflecting existing econom-
ic conditions. 
The descriptive analysis of the price of credit in the EMU countries focuses on two 
annualized interest rates and a credit spread. To start with, we track the behaviour of the cost 
of borrowing for non-financial corporations (CoBNFC) and a general short-term measure of 
money market conditions in the EMU.30 The difference between the two interest rates is the 
credit spread which is intended to capture the risk premium that banks charge for making 
loans to companies that are saddled with default risk.31  
                                                 
28 This definition of the finance mix is similar but not identical to the one employed by Kashyap, Stein and 
Wilcox’s (1993). They use commercial paper as the alternative to short-term bank loans. Also, our measure of 
bank loans is more comprehensive as it includes all loans, short and longer-term loans. 
29 The notion that interest rates are flexible is not universally accepted. Indeed, under asymmetric informa-
tion, profit-maximizing banks engage in equilibrium credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)), causing the 
bank lending rate to become rigid. By extension, credit spreads may not capture the rationing of bank loans. 
30 The cost of borrowing for non-financial corporations is an interest rate series computed by the ECB. In the 
ECB’s description, it is a narrowly defined effective rate charged by credit and other institutions on loans (A2A 
and A2Z), where the total is calculated by weighting the volume with a moving average. The sum of A2A and 
A2Z comprises loans and revolving loans, overdrafts and extended credit card debt. We also examined the 
behaviour of an inflation-adjusted measure of the cost of borrowing. As the inflation-adjusted measure 
(CoBNFC – CPI inflation) turned out to be uninformative in the forecasting exercise, we do not further describe 
its behaviour over the sample period here. 
31 The risk premium inherent in the cost of borrowing is measured relative to the risk premium of the money 
market rate. As shown in Table 2 we have also looked at an alternative measure of the credit spread, the ECB-
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 Figure 5 shows the movements in the CoBNFC, the 3-month euro area-wide money mar-
ket interest rate, and the spread in the ten EMU countries over the whole sample period.32 
Note the surprising differences in the nominal borrowing rates between the individual coun-
tries at the beginning of the sample period. The CoBNFC was higher in Germany, for in-
stance, than in Spain and about equal to the rate in Italy. France and Finland had the lowest 
CoBNFC while Greece and Portugal had the highest. Scrutinizing the behaviour of the spread 
in Figure 5 and Table 5 is equally intriguing. Unlike in the case of credit quantities, the spread 
adheres to a far more cohesive pattern in all countries. For instance, the spread decreases in all 
countries in the initial stage of the sample period, falling below 50 basis points in Austria, 
Finland, France, and the Netherlands. Another example is the level of the spread observed at 
the beginning of the sample period relative to that at the end. Figure 6 shows that the spread 
had risen considerably in the majority of the countries by the end of the sample period, 
particularly in countries on the southern flank (except Italy), Finland, France, and Belgium. A 
third shared feature is that the spread rises during recessions in all countries as would be 
expected given that the probability of default increases during an economic downturn.  A 
comparison of the minimums and maximums of the spread recorded during recessions is also 
revealing. As Figure 7 illustrates, both the minimums and maximums of the spread were 
higher during the second recession than during the first. Indeed, the minimum of the spread 
increased considerably more in all countries during the second recession than during the first, 
a clear indication that the European Debt Crisis led to elevated risk premiums throughout the 
monetary union. Lenders demanded higher compensation for risky loans because the spectre 
of sovereign debt default had infected financial markets, particularly on the southern pe-
riphery. 
Yet there are also stark differences between the country-specific spreads. Figure 8 shows a 
clear difference between, loosely speaking, North (A, B, D, FI, F, NL) and South (E, GR, I, P) 
over the period 2003–2016: the standard deviation of the spread is appreciably higher in the 
countries on the southern flank than in the other EMU countries where the standard deviation 
is tightly clustered around 0.45 per cent. The mean of the spread in Portugal and Greece at 
3.48 per cent and 4.02 per cent, respectively, was roughly 200–250 basis points higher than 
the mean of the spread averaged across the North of 1.54 per cent. A final difference concerns 
the behaviour of the spread in the aftermath of the second recession. Turning back to Figure 5, 
we observe that at the end of the sample period the spread had decreased by approximately 
200 basis points in Portugal, 130 basis points in Italy, 100 basis points in Spain, and nearly 
100 basis points in Greece while the spread in the northern countries remained quite constant 





                                                                                                                                                        
spread, which is based on the swap rate. But since the correlation of the spread and the ECB-spread is very high 
– it ranges from a low of 0.87 in France to a high of 0.99 in Spain – our discussion of price-based measures of 
credit in this section will concentrate on the spread. The ECB-spread figures in the construction of the regression 
framework in Section 4.3. 
32 The level of interest rates is measured along the left-hand vertical axis while the spread is measured along 
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Figure 5: Market Interest Rates and the Spread (%) 
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Note: 1 Sample period ends 2016m2.  
Recession 1: 2008m4–2009m6. Recession 2: 2011m10–2013m3 (According to CEPR). 




Austria 1.82 1.93 0.45 1.99 1.43 0.40 (0.45, 1.68) (1.30, 1.95) 
Belgium 1.44 2.12 0.55 2.18 1.48 0.44 (0.55, 1.39) (1.28, 2.18) 
Finland 0.85 1.79 0.26 2.14 1.30 0.45 (0.33, 1.32) (1.11, 1.98) 
France 0.89 1.93 0.41 2.07 1.44 0.46 (0.42, 1.70) (1.59, 2.07) 
Germany 2.09 2.25 0.84 2.78 1.99 0.44 (0.84, 2.38) (2.04, 2.55) 
Greece1 2.87 5.31 1.80 6.49 4.02 1.41 (1.80, 3.74) (5.31, 6.49) 
Italy 2.27 2.56 0.99 3.93 2.38 0.78 (1.13, 2.40) (2.55, 3.93) 
Netherlands 1.57 1.78 0.49 2.25 1.58 0.44 (0.49, 1.72) (1.42, 2.22) 
Portugal 2.61 3.50 1.48 5.96 3.48 1.31 (1.67, 3.63) (5.14, 5.96) 
Spain 1.36 2.57 0.76 3.65 1.93 0.87 (0.76, 1.80) (2.36, 3.33) 
 
 
Figure 6: The Spread at the Beginning and End of the Sample Period (%) 
Note: A=Austria, B=Belgium, D=Germany, E=Spain, F=France, FI=Finland, GR=Greece, I=Italy,  



















































































Figure 8: The Mean and Standard Deviation of the Spread (%) 
Note: SD= Standard Deviation. 
 
 
4.3. The specification of the forecasting equation 
 
The principal aim of this paper is to investigate whether price-based or quantity-based credit 
measures are better at predicting in-sample movements in economic indicators. In view of the 
short sample period, we adopt a rather parsimonious specification of the forecasting equation 
to capture the effect of lagged changes in the financial indicators on current economic 
activity:33 









∆uvwhFk + xh (0)
where ∆gh = growth rate of a measure of economic activity yh (annualized) in period t: 
 ∆gh = 1200	log	
yh
yhFn (0)
 ∆qrhFk = first difference of the spread in period t-j where the spread is defined as the 
 difference between the cost of borrowing for NFC (non-financial corporations) and 
 the euro-area 3-month money market interest rate. 
                                                 
33 Given the short sample interval, we do not consider various forecasting horizons such as 3, 6 or 12 months. 
The sample period spans only 13 years which makes discussions about the longer-run behaviour of economic 
indicators and financial information variables somewhat problematic. For this reason we decided not to test for 
cointegration of the variables in question. Prior to carrying out the forecasting exercise, we examined the 
temporal properties of the time series data. Employing Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, we found that with one 
exception (the turnover of capital goods series in Portugal) the null hypothesis of non-stationarity could not be 
























 ∆uvwhFk = first difference of the mix in period t-j where the mix is defined as follows: 
uvw = |1}q	~|	_`|1}q	~|	_` + axsv~vxq	vqqx	og	_` 
A second specification of the forecasting equation replaces ∆qr with	∆qr. This 
alternative definition of the credit spread is defined as the difference between the cost of 
borrowing for NFC and the swap rate. Importantly, this definition of the credit spread uses a 
measure of the cost of borrowing that applies only to new loans. A precise definition of this 
series can be found in Table 2. 
Standard testing procedures are followed to determine the predictive content of the credit 
spreads and the finance mix for four indicators of economic activity. In the first instance, we 
test the hypothesis that m (n) lags of the change in the credit spread (finance mix) are jointly 
insignificant by means of an F-test.34,35 
We also employ a t-test to verify the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients (SoC) 
oksk		v = 1, 2, …u	}	on m (n) lags of the credit spread (finance mix) equals zero. The 
purpose of the “sign” test is to establish the direction of causality and to measure the marginal 
effect of past changes in the financial market indicator on the economic indicator. Drawing 
out the implications of the theoretical framework of Section 2, we would expect the sign on 
the sum of the coefficients on the credit spread to be negative for Industrial Production, Retail 
Sales, and Capital Turnover but positive for the Rate of Unemployment. Just the reverse is the 
case for the expected sign on the sum of the coefficients of the finance mix variable with the 
sign being positive for Industrial Production, Retail Sales and Capital Turnover but negative 
for the Rate of Unemployment. 
 
4.4. Econometric results 
 
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the examination of the in-sample forecasting performance 
of the financial information variables for the four economic indicators in all countries. For 
each economic indicator the tables report the following information: 
• The lag length of the estimated forecasting equation as determined by the Akaike informa-
tion criterion.  
• The goodness of fit measure	Y . 
• The F-test statistic of the exclusion restriction; the number in brackets is the probability 
that the null hypothesis can be rejected. The pair of numbers in italics at the top of the cell 
applies to the credit spread while the pair of numbers at the bottom applies to the finance 
mix. 
• The t-test statistic for the hypothesis that the coefficients on the lags of the financial 
indicator sum to zero. The pair of numbers reported is the sum of the coefficients and the 
associated standard error (in parentheses). The entries at the top of the cell in italics refer 
to the credit spread while the entries at the bottom refer to the finance mix. 
  
                                                 
34 Because the standard errors are computed in accordance with Newey and West (1987), the computed  
F-statistic does not have the standard finite sample properties. Hence the reported F-statistics are indicative only.  
35 When appropriate, the forecasting equations include indicator variables to mark significant exogenous 
events such as the reclassification of loans in Austria in 2004 or in Spain in 2012. No indicator variable is 
included in the forecasting equation for Greece as the changes in the finance mix were due to economic events. 
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Table 6: The Effects of the Spread and the Finance Mix on Measures of Economic Activity: 2004:02–2016:m03 (cont.) 
































1. The turnover of the capital goods series for Portugal is clearly stationary. Hence the log of this series appears in the regression specification. 
2. For Austria we also tried an adjusted finance mix that accounts for the reclassification of loans in June 2004 by way of a dummy variable. Changes in the finance mix were regressed on a dummy (1 in June 2004, 0 
otherwise) and a constant. The residuals of this regression were then used as the adjusted finance mix in the subsequent estimation of the effect of financial indicator variables on economic activity. The results 
obtained were very similar to those reported in Tables 6 and 7, which are based on changes in the unadjusted mix variable.  
3. Estimated specification of the regression equation (unless indicated otherwise):  









∆uvwhFk + xh 
where ∆g = first difference of an annualized measure of economic activity, ∆qr = change of the spread between the cost of borrowing for NFC (non-financial corporations) and the euro-area 3-month money market 
interest rate.   ∆uvw = ∆ Ut	h	ST5Ut	h	ST5DV]khk	k<		ST5 
3. The coefficients on the dummy variables in the forecasting equation for Austria and Spain are insignificant. Hence the results reported are based on the standard specification above. 
F = F-statistic of the null hypothesis that m (n) lags of the change in the spread (finance mix) are jointly insignificant. The number in brackets is the probability that the null hypothesis can be rejected (p-value). SoC = 
t-test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients oksk		v = 1, 2,…u	}	on m (n) lags of the spread (finance mix) equals zero. The number reported at the top of the cell is the sum of the coefficients. The 
number below in parentheses is the standard error.
 Turnover of Capital Goods 
   Lags(l,m,n) Y F [p-val] SoC 
Austria 
(2007:07− 
  2016:03) 
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1. The turnover of the capital goods series for Portugal is clearly stationary. Hence the log of this series appears in the regression specification. 
2. Estimated specification of the regression equation (unless indicated otherwise): 
 ∆gh = 1i + ∑ 1klkmn ∆ghFk + ∑ okpkmn ∆qrhFk + ∑ sktkmn ∆uvwhFk + xh 
where ∆g = first difference of an annualized measure of economic activity  
∆qr = change of the weighted lending spread between the MIR rate for new NFC (non-financial corporation) loans and the swap rate (maturity adjusted). 
∆uvw = ∆ |1}q	~|	_`|1}q	~|	_` + axsv~vxq	vqqx	og	_` 
F = F-statistic of the null hypothesis that m (n) lags of the change in the ECB spread (finance mix) are jointly insignificant. The number in brackets is the probability that the null hypothesis can be rejected 
(p-value). SoC = t-test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients oksk		v = 1, 2, …u	}	on m (n) lags of the ECB spread (finance mix) equals zero. The number reported at the top of the cell is the 
sum of the coefficients. The number below in parentheses is the standard error. All variables were tested for non-stationarity. Non-stationary variables have been differenced. 
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Inspection of Table 6 reveals that lagged increases in the spread had the expected negative 
marginal effect on Industrial Production in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, and Portugal over 
the sample period. However, the predictive content and the economic significance of past 
realizations of the spread for this economic indicator varied considerably in strength from 
country to country. The forecasting power and the economic effect of the spread are very 
strong in Austria and Portugal, where a sustained increase of 10 basis points per period in the 
lags of the spread is associated with a 2.45 per cent marginal decrease in Industrial Production 
in Austria and a 1.48 per cent decrease in Portugal.36 For Italy the predictive power and eco-
nomic significance of the spread are somewhat weaker. In Belgium only the economic impact 
of the spread seems to have been felt. In Finland, the predictive content of the spread is weak 
but the economic impact is material. In the remaining countries the spread has neither an 
effect on nor predictive content for Industrial Production. 
The mix variable fares worse. While there is some evidence that changes in the finance 
mix variable predict changes in Industrial Production fairly well in Finland, Germany and 
Italy, the test statistic for the sum of the coefficients is either positive but below the  
10 per cent critical value or, as in Finland, above it but negative. Similarly negative coeffi-
cients are reported for Greece (at the 1 per cent level of significance) and Austria (at the  
10 per cent level). The negative sign is inconsistent with the notion that firms raise credit on 
the open market in the wake of experiencing cuts in their bank borrowing due to reduced 
willingness of the banks to lend. 
There is only scant evidence that Retail Sales were adversely affected by past increases in 
the spread. The results show that lagged increases in the spread have predictive power for 
Retail Sales in four countries but their adverse economic impact is only felt strongly in the 
Netherlands and weakly in France. As far as predictive content is concerned, the results show 
a statistically significant relationship between the finance mix and Retail Sales in three 
countries, France, Greece and the Netherlands. But in none of these countries is there any 
evidence for a sustained positive relationship between the financial indicator and the eco-
nomic indicator as implied by the theoretical model. Indeed in Greece the t-test statistic, while 
exceeding the critical value at the 1 per cent level of significance, is negative; a similar result 
obtains in Austria. The only country where the sum of coefficients on lagged values of the 
finance mix is positive and statistically different from zero is Portugal. 
For the Rate of Unemployment we again see mixed results. It is true that the spread has 
predictive content in six of the ten countries, albeit to varying degrees. When complemented 
by the t-test for the sum of the coefficients, the results become weaker. Only in Greece, Italy 
and the Netherlands is there solid evidence of a positive relationship between past changes in 
the spread and changes in the Unemployment Rate. Notice though that the cumulative 
marginal effect of past increases in the spread on changes in the Unemployment Rate were 
positive and economically significant in Portugal and Belgium. In Greece we find a strong 
link between past changes in the finance mix and movements in the Unemployment Rate but 
                                                 
36 The total effect of lagged changes in the spread on economic activity depends on the interaction of the sum 
of estimated coefficients with the persistence property of the variable measuring economic activity. Given the 
long lag structure of the estimated specification it is exceedingly difficult to determine the overall effect. The 
sum of coefficients reported thus captures only the marginal effect of lagged changes in the spread on current 
economic activity. 
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again with an implausible sign as in the case of Industrial Production and Retail Sales. For the 
Netherlands, the exclusion restriction can be rejected at the 5 per cent level but the sum of 
coefficients is not significantly different from zero. Notice that the fit of the estimated 
regression is poorer for Italy and Portugal than for the other countries. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, a measure of spending on investment goods produces the most 
favourable results for the spread as a sound financial predictor. In five of the ten countries 
lagged changes in the spread predict changes in the Turnover of Capital Goods. The pre-
dictive ability of the spread for this indicator of investment activity is particularly strong in 
France, Greece and Italy but weaker in Austria and Germany. The t-test of the cumulative 
marginal effect of lagged changes in the spread on changes in Capital Turnover produces the 
correct negative sign in all countries, though its economic impact is only felt significantly in 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Belgium. The 
marginal effect of an increase in the spread on capital spending varies in strength from 
country to country but is particularly acute in Finland where a sustained 10 basis point in-
crease in the spread over a 12 month period is associated with an almost 11 per cent decrease 
in sales of capital goods. 
There is less predictive content in the finance mix variable. In Belgium and Italy past 
changes in the finance mix forecast changes in capital goods quite well; less so in Finland and 
Portugal. But again the finance mix variable fails the sum of coefficients test except in Italy. 
So Italy is the only country where both price-based and quantity-based financial information 
variables in the forecasting equation provide independent information for future movements 
of capital spending in a way that is consistent with the ACS model. 
To check the robustness of the predictive ability of credit spreads, we repeated the fore-
casting exercise using the ECB-spread alongside the finance mix. As indicated earlier, the 
ECB-spread differs from the spread in that it is based on the cost of new loans only and uses 
the swap rate as the riskless rate. Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that the predictive 
ability and the economic effect of the ECB-spread are somewhat weaker than those of the 
spread. In the case of Industrial Production in Italy and Retail Sales in France and the Nether-
lands, the ECB-spread has neither predictive power nor a systematic negative effect, whereas 
the spread does. The predictive power of the ECB-spread as measured by the exclusion 
restriction is also weaker for the Turnover of Capital Goods in Austria, France, and Germany. 
In contrast, the ECB-spread outperforms the spread as a predictor for Industrial Production in 
Belgium and Germany. For the Rate of Unemployment, there are merely minor changes in the 
performance of the two credit spreads in the ten countries of the EMU.   
An Alternative Spread Based on Bond Yields 
Up to now the credit spreads employed in the forecasting exercise have been based on the 
cost of borrowing from banks. We now introduce a credit spread based on bond yields. 
Following the work of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), Guender and Tolan (2017) employ 
monthly firm-level corporate data to design an aggregate bond yield spread that is meant to 
capture the risk premium in the corporate bond market in a number of European countries on 
the periphery and Germany at the centre. With the help of yields on zero coupon German 
government bonds, which are deemed safe, Guender and Tolan calculate the yield to maturity 









Yh5= the yield on corporate bond j in period t 
YhkF= yield on the synthetic “risk-free” bond j in period t.37 
n = number of observations (individual corporate bonds) in period t. 
Guender and Tolan document that the risk premium rises in all countries before and during 
the European-wide recessions and acts as a reliable signal for near term economic activity. 
For a subset of the ten countries – Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain – we examine the 
forecasting power of the GZ-spread and the finance mix, using the observations of the risk 
premium calculated by Guender and Tolan for the period 2004:02–2012:m08. The results of 
this exercise are shown in Table 8. Changes in the GZ-spread have impressive predictive 
power for Industrial Production and a significant impact on it in all countries but Spain. The 
results are a bit weaker for Retail Sales, where the GZ-spread performs best in Germany and 
Spain, and the Turnover of Capital Goods, where the GZ-spread does very well in Germany 
and Italy. Lagged changes in the bond spread correctly predict the direction of change in the 
Rate of Unemployment only in Italy. It is interesting to note that the sum of the coefficients 
on lags of the change in the bond spread has the correct negative sign in the forecasting 
equations for Industrial Production, Retail Sales, and the Turnover of Capital Goods in all 
four countries. In the subset of countries investigated the finance mix again does rather poorly 
as a predictor of economic activity. Only in two cases (Retail Sales in Spain and Capital 
Spending in Italy) does the finance mix predict the direction of change in economic activity 
correctly and to great effect. This is consistent with the results reported earlier for the ‘spread’ 
in Italy where changes in both the finance mix and the GZ-spread predict changes in capital 
spending in a way that is consistent with the theoretical framework of this paper.38 
 
  
                                                 
37 The synthetic bond j has the same underlying characteristics as the risky corporate bond j (Term to 
maturity, coupon payments, etc.) 
38 A direct comparison to the results reported earlier is hampered by the shorter sample period for the fore-
casting equations based on the GZ-spread. The strong predictive ability and positive effect of the finance mix on 
Retail Sales in Spain may seem surprising given its lacklustre performance in the forecasting equations which 
included the ‘spread’ or ‘ECB-spread’. However, changes in the finance mix variable do have impressive 
predictive ability and a strong positive effect on Retail Sales in Spain when paired with the ‘spread’ or the ‘ECB-
spread’ and estimated over the shorter sample period which ends in August 2012. This finding resonates in part 
with the observation of Ciccarelli et al. (2013) that a potent bank-lending channel of monetary policy was 
operative in the stressed countries at the height of the Global Financial Crisis. 
Table 8: The Effects of the GZ-Spread (Bond Yield Spread) and the Finance Mix on Measures of Economic Activity: 
2004:02−2012:m08 
 Industrial Production Retail Sales Unemployment Rate 
 Lags(l,m,n) Y F [p-val] SoC Lags(l,m,n) Y F [p-val]  SoC Lags(l,m,n) Y F[p-val] SoC 





































































































































Table 8: The Effects of the GZ-Spread (Bond Yield Spread) and the Finance Mix on 




























1. The turnover of the capital goods series for Portugal is clearly stationary. Hence the log of this series appears in the regression specification. 
2. Estimated specification of the regression equation (unless indicated otherwise): 
 ∆gh = 1i + ∑ 1klkmn ∆ghFk + ∑ okpkmn ∆qrhFk + ∑ sktkmn ∆uvwhFk + xh 
where ∆g = first difference of an annualized measure of economic activity, ∆qr = change of the weighted lending spread between the 
MIR rate for new NFC (non-financial corporation) loans and the swap rate (maturity adjusted). 
∆uvw = ∆ |1}q	~|	_`|1}q	~|	_` + axsv~vxq	vqqx	og	_` 
F = F-statistic of the null hypothesis that m (n) lags of the change in the ECB spread (finance mix) are jointly insignificant. The number in 
brackets is the probability that the null hypothesis can be rejected (p-value). SoC = t-test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients 
oksk		v = 1, 2, …u	}	on m (n) lags of the ECB spread (finance mix) equals zero. The number reported at the top of the cell is the sum of 
the coefficients. The number below in parentheses is the standard error. All variables were tested for non-stationarity. Non-stationary 
variables have been differenced. 




5. Conclusions  
 
In a recent paper, Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2013) propose a model of the credit market to 
document a few stylized facts about the behaviour of the prices and quantities of credit, the 
size of the banking sector relative to the bond market, and leverage as market sentiment 
changes. Looking at macro and micro-level US data, they find a good deal of empirical 
support for rising credit spreads, a substitution of bonds for bank finance, and deleveraging 
during the Global Financial Crisis.   
An important prediction of their theoretical framework is that an increase in default risk 
causes the credit spread to rise and the bond market to expand at the expense of the banking 
sector. This paper examines this hypothesis and traces its implications for real economic 
activity in ten member states of the euro area over the period 2003:1–2016:3. To implement 
the empirical test, we construct three credit spreads and one quantity-based finance mix.  
 Turnover of Capital Goods 
 Lags(l,m,n) Y F [p-val] SoC  













































The difference between the cost of borrowing and a short-term money market rate rose 
unambiguously during the two recessions in all the countries of the EMU included in this 
study. The ‘spread’ had, however, not risen substantially in a single country before the onset 
of the first recession, a clear indication that the financial markets were caught unaware of the 
oncoming financial and economic turmoil. In the interval between the two recessions the 
spread continued to rise on the southern fringe of the EMU, in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 
By comparison, movements in the finance mix variable were less systematic.   
The empirical results show that credit spreads provide a more reliable signal about near-
term economic activity than the composition of external finance. A presumed link between 
changes in the composition of external finance, which the bank lending view interprets as 
loan supply constraints, and changes in real economic activity does not appear to exist. These 
findings tend to support Adrian, Colla, and Shin’s basic contention that “[i]n our model, the 
impact on real economic activity comes from the spike in risk premiums rather than contrac-
tion in the total quantity of credit” (p. 49).  
Overall the findings suggest, however, that the forecasting performance of credit spreads 
over a short horizon in the ten EMU member states is rather spotty. This assessment is based 
on the uneven performance of the credit spreads. The ‘spread’ is arguably a better predictor of 
real economic activity than the ECB-spread, which is the difference between the cost of 
taking out new loans and the swap rate. Even so, the ‘spread’ fails to predict consistently 
across either a range of monthly economic indicators or across countries. The strongest evi-
dence in favour of the predictive ability of credit spreads comes from the corporate bond 
market. A risk premium extracted from corporate bond yields predicts Industrial Production, 
Retail Sales, and Turnover of Capital Goods fairly well in Southern Europe and Germany. 
On balance, the size of the financial sector is not tied to the near-term forecasting perfor-
mance of financial indicators. Neither the spreads nor the finance mix variable have greater 
predictive ability in the Netherlands or Belgium, where the financial sector accounts for a far 
greater share of total GDP, than in countries with smaller financial sectors such as Finland 
and Greece. 
Examining developments in credit markets in the euro area over the past 15 years leads to 
the conclusion that these markets have evolved unevenly. In the Netherlands, and particularly 
in Finland and France, the bond market was an important secondary source of credit long 
before the Global Financial Crisis. By contrast, in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and 
Portugal, the bond market’s relative share of the credit market gradually increased over the 
sample period whereas it remained very small in Greece and Spain. The empirical study finds 
mixed evidence for the substitution hypothesis of bond finance for bank credit during 
recessions in the Euro area. While there is no evidence at all for it during the first recession, 
there is selective evidence that bond issuance expanded and bank loans contracted during the 
second recession particularly in France and Italy and to a lesser extent in Greece and Spain. 
 48 
Further investigation of the quantitative importance of bond finance versus bank finance 
for real economic activity in the EMU is warranted. One obvious limitation of the current 
study is that it is based entirely on macro-level data. A micro-level data analysis of the 
composition of external finance in the EMU along the lines of Becker and Ivashina (2014) 
and ACS (2013) would shed further light on whether the bond markets of Europe have 
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